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Publisher's Preview 
If one were to notice Christine Delaplace’s monograph stacked in a library 
shelf, there could be an immanent risk of not being recognized for what it 
truly is. Labelled on its spine “La fin de l’Empire romain d’Occident”, a 
weary reader might skip over yet another book ostensibly recounting the 
end of western Roman power; a topic well covered over the last decade. The 
equally unfortunate choice of choosing Joseph-Noël Sylvestre’s 1890 Sac 
du Rome for the cover, featuring semi-naked Gerard Butler-esque warriors 
tearing down statues, might even urge one to skip another seemingly 
Romans-versus-Barbarians driven narrative. Fear not, weary reader, 
because its profound focus emerges via the front cover’s subtitle “Rome et 
les Wisigoths de 382 à 531”. While the Visigoths have obtained satisfactory 
attention in those recent surveys charting the late fourth to early sixth 
century CE, they have not yet received a modern monograph treating them 
on their own especially concerning their ninety-year long settlement in 
Aquitaine. This crucial episode is the core of Delaplace’s work, and a topic 
conspicuously absent in our ever-expanding libraries. Hence this is a most 
welcome addition to a recent growing body of scholarship treating groups 
such as the Huns, Ostrogoths or Vandals.  
Part 1 surveys the historiography of the Goths. Part 2 gives us a longue 
durée grounding in Rome’s external relations with foreign powers, through 
assessments of envoys and embassies, espionage, and the mechanics of 
treaties, from the Republic to the fourth-century Empire. This is 
fundamental to understand one of Delaplace’s main theses: the Goths who 
emerged from the Adrianople fiasco and were integrated into Rome’s 
military structures after 382 were never conceived as an independent foreign 
nation on imperial soil. Part 3 charts the involvement of Gothic leaders 
during the many wars bedevilling imperial courts between 382-418. 
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Delaplace argues that Alaric was not the ethnic leader of the ‘united Balkan 
Goths’, but essentially a war-leader with a significant military following in 
tow, willing to seek an agreement for armed service. She identifies the main 
problems destabilizing the imperial centre not as migrations, but politics—
especially the vexed issue of how to counter usurpation.  
Part 4 looks at the evolution of the Visigoths as auxiliaries of the western 
Roman army (c. 418-455). Delaplace demonstrates that the Goths who 
settled in Aquitaine got a considerably less favourable deal than Alaric had 
during his stints as imperial commander. The few times that their reges—
kings of men but never kings of a state—went to war with the western court, 
the wars were almost inevitably driven by two factors: trying to revise the 
terms of Vallia’s 416 agreement, which enabled Gothic military 
reintegration, or having to take sides in conflicts emanating from the centre 
(such as Ioannes’ usurpation or the conflict between Aëtius and Sebastian). 
When a new foedus was finally awarded in 439, they continued playing their 
part in a substantially weakened defence system following the Vandal 
conquest of the Roman Maghreb (for which the onus is firmly squared on 
Aëtius’ shoulders). Part 5 shows how a Visigothic army finally ended up 
achieving a territorial kingdom between 455 and 477. Delaplace is at her 
finest when deconstructing Sidonius Apollinaris’ anti-Gothic testimony, 
originating from his collusion with the Burgundians who had propped up 
the illegitimate imperial upstarts Olybrius and Glycerius (472-474), which 
ultimately led to his exile. Only when the last western emperors had made 
themselves obsolete, and Odoacer struck a treaty with Euric that recognized 
the latter’s acquisition of Provence in 477, did a true successor kingdom 
come into being. Finally, an epilogue shows how even in the period up to 
531, Clovis’ victory at Vouillé in 507 did not mark a terminus post quem 
for Visigothic history, but rather one more re-shuffling of the Late Roman 
‘Commonwealth’ as had occurred in previous decades and was bound to 
continue until Justinian’s wars. Delaplace does a painstaking job analysing 
the fragmentary contemporary sources, and placing them in their proper 
context. This reviewer finds himself in agreement with many of her verdicts 
and guiding principles in her reconstruction of events, but with some 
caveats.  
There is a rigid tendency to paint a consistent picture of the Visigoths as 
loyal to legitimate emperors throughout the period of 416-476. This 
certainly counts as an improvement over visions of “predatory migrants”, 
but sometimes the pendulum swings too far in the other direction. 
Occasionally one encounters some very special pleading, up to the point 
where, e.g., the generalissimo Ricimer suddenly becomes a bête noire for 
obstructing this Romano-Gothic dynamic. He is even found responsible for 
sabotaging Majorian’s fleet in 460 (p. 228), using Childeric’s Franks against 
Aegidius in the mid 460s (p. 238), and employing Rhiotamus’ Britons to the 
detriment of Anthemius in the late 460s (pp. 249-250). Ricimer will 
probably always be remembered as the western Roman Empire’s 
Kingslayer, but no source ever connected him to any of the aforementioned 
events. 
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While Delaplace should be applauded for placing Visigothic history in a 
suitable institutional framework, a few of her conceptual paradigms could 
have benefitted from more thorough elaboration. To state the most pertinent 
one, the Gothic groups emerging from the post-382 settlement are often 
described as mercenaries. This is a term that has merit for military actors in 
antiquity, especially during the Hellenistic era, but is fraught with much 
more difficulty for Late Antiquity. It conjures modern images of men 
willing to hire out their armed services to various parties in order to reap 
private gains. In fact, the only Late Antique groups whom we could identify 
serving the Empire thusly are the various Hunnic bands before Attila’s 
consolidation of autocracy in the 440s. Similarly, Delaplace often styles 
Gothic leaders such as Alaric or Sarus even more anachronistically as 
condottieri, suggesting a level of professionalism that may not always seem 
compatible with their modus operandi . Faute de mieux, these models can 
work if one is willing to define them more in depth, as seen in other recent 
studies on ancient warfare.1  
In fact, Delaplace is at her most convincing when she analyses Visigothic 
military interaction with the Empire from a much better established Roman 
perspective, namely that of the Republic and its socii. Indeed, from the 380s 
to the 470s, the Goths essentially acted as clients and allies of a government 
that desired their military aid, but was generally unwilling to grant them the 
status that would have allowed them to participate in state affairs. This 
becomes abundantly clear in Alaric’s negotiations with Honorius (408-410), 
a rare case where the sources elucidate various terms, and where the former 
was much more concerned to become a magister militum than getting land 
to farm.  
One has to admire the rigor with which Delaplace spells out the debate. Very 
few pages pass where a scholar is not properly credited in the main text, 
even to the extent of providing a chart to point out key differences between 
Wolf Liebeschuetz’ and Peter Heather’s views on the Visigothic genesis (p. 
103). But one stumbles upon a striking limit in the status quaestionis. 
Delaplace admits that the brunt of this work was composed before 2008 and 
this is principally where the bibliography stops (pp. 16, 301). When one 
inspects the critical apparatus, however, it becomes clear that the literature 
rarely goes beyond the early 2000s.  
More surprisingly, there is very little engagement with some of the major 
cited works defining and polemicizing the current debate, such as Heather’s 
Fall of the Roman Empire, Guy Halsall’s Barbarian Migrations and 
Michael Kulikowski’s Rome’s Gothic Wars. Sometimes this leads to 
awkward cases, such as her championing of Kulikowski’s re-dating of the 
Rhine invasion by Alans, Vandals and Sueves to 31 December 405 (p. 131). 
Yet Kulikowski himself has conceded that Anthony Birley’s vindication of 
the traditional date of 31 December 406 may stand after all. 2 Similarly, 
among the many dates proposed for the inception of a (semi) sovereign 
Visigothic polity, Halsall’s arguments in favour of 439 are glossed over.3 
To list one final example: while there is a justified dismissal of Giuseppe 
Zecchini’s key argument to appraise Aëtius’ 442 treaty with the Vandals, 
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i.e. that it allowed him to shore up defences against a Hunnic war that would 
not occur until a decade later, it goes unmentioned that this is also vital in 
Heather’s vigorous appraisal of Aëtius’ policies.4 None of this undermines 
Delaplace’s work, but it could have been rewarding to tease out the 
distinctions between these various landmarks and how they complement or 
contrast her central theses.  
Some errata: The map depicting Alaric’s itinerary in the Balkans places his 
397 battle with Stilicho in Epirus, but this should be the Peloponnese (p. V). 
Vandals, Alans and Sueves did not cross a frozen Rhine in 406 (p. 19)—this 
is a Gibbonian construct for which there is no source evidence. Ammianus 
was not the last Roman author producing a classical Latin historiography 
(p. 36), but Renatus Profuturus Frigeridus. John Rich’s Declaring War in 
the Roman Republic was published in 1976, not 1946 (p. 48, n. 2). “L’auteur 
de la Chronique de Prosper, publiée vers 443”, is naturally Prosper himself 
(p. 109). Honorius did not arrange the murder of Belleridus, but did allow 
the murder to go unpunished (pp. 149-150). Bonifatius did not participate 
in Castinus’ Spanish campaign, since he had already deserted it previously 
(p. 197). Prosper did hail from Aquitaine, but was no longer living there 
when he was writing his works (p. 210). The treaty of 475 was struck 
between Julius Nepos and Euric, not Theoderic II (p. 213). There is no 
evidence that Leo I ever appointed the warlord Marcellinus as magister 
militum Dalmatiae in 461 (p. 231), only that his nephew Julius Nepos 
became one later (CJ 6.65.1). The comes Paulus killed near Angers c. 470 
was perhaps a successor of Aegidius, but certainly not of Syagrius floruit c. 
486 (p. 249, n. 76). Last but not least, the pagan historiographer Zosimus is 
probably spinning in his urn hearing that he wrote a Histoire ecclésiastique 
(p. 102).5 Nevertheless, at the end of the day, this reviewer cannot 
emphasize strongly enough that this book is one of the most important new 
contributions to the field of Gothic studies. It has all the hallmarks of 
becoming a seminal work. Indeed, in French literature it already stands 
unrivalled. In 21st-century academia, where not only students but even 
scholars engage overwhelmingly with works published in their own 
language, one can only hope that Delaplace’s monograph will earn the 
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5.   Some typographical errors: ‘Transformation od the Roman World’ (p. 
27, n. 21) ‘Journal of Mediaval History’ (p. 27, n. 22), ‘firts' (p. 105, n. 
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